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The aim of this study is to bring to light and make clear the characteristic equivoque
Pavlov made when he conceived the neurophysiological circuit involved in conditioned
behavior as if this circuit  contained or  reduced,  in its own terms, such behavior. I also
wish to point out how this interpretation implies a distorted concept of the relationships
between neurophysiology and behavior. As an alternative, it is proposed that behavior,
which is always operant behavior, is not at all reducible to its neurophysiological
ingredients, but instead acts like an arrow-head for adaptation that, in turn, confers a
subordinate function to the neurophysiological ingredients involved. To make this evident,
behavior is considered an operant organic activity that takes place in an environment of
“remote co-present” texture, and different from its neurophysiological ingredients, which
take place within the context of spatial contiguity relationships.
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Este trabajo pretende desvelar y deshacer el equívoco característico en el que incurrió
Pavlov al entender el circuito neurofisiológico involucrado en la conducta condicionada
por él descubierto como si este circuito contuviese o se redujese, en sus propios términos,
a dicha conducta, y señalar de qué modo esta interpretación implica una concepción
distorsionada de las relaciones entre neurofisiología y conducta. Alternativamente, se
propone que la conducta, que además es siempre conducta operante, no es en modo
alguno reductible a sus condiciones o ingredientes neurofisiológicos, sino que funciona
siempre como la punta de lanza de la adaptación en cuyo seno tienen sentido funcional
subordinado sus propias condiciones o ingredientes neurofisiológicos por ella involucrados.
Para demostrar esto se propone entender la conducta como actividad orgánica operante
dada en un ambiente de textura “co-presente a distancia”, a diferencia de sus ingredientes
neurofisiológicos que se darían en el contexto de las relaciones por contigüidad espacial. 
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General Presentation of the Aim and the Issue
Addressed in this Study
The aim of this study is to show how, in the course of
his discovery and interpretation of conditioned reflexes, Pavlov
characteristically incurred in the equivoque of considering the
neurophysiological circuit involved in the conditioned behavior
that he discovered not only as a neurophysiological process,
but also-and here is the root of the equivoque-as if this process
contained, absorbed, or reduced such behavioral activity. As
we shall see, initially, this allowed Pavlov to advocate an
alleged reductionist explanation, insofar as it was
neurophysiological, of a supposed mental activity that he
always regarded from a mentalist and representational-dualist
viewpoint. At a later stage in his thinking, Pavlov finally
modulated and radicalized this claim by an explicit assumption
of some kind of reductionist fusion of the neurophysiological
process and the supposed mental activity.
As I will attempt to show in this paper, the error incurred
by the above-mentioned equivoque lies basically in the
unawareness of the fact that behavioral activity is not at all
reduced to the neurophysiological process always involved in
such activity, but instead that this process should only be
considered as the necessary involved neurophysiological
ingredient of behavior. Therefore, behavior, insofar as it is not
reduced to this neurophysiological ingredient, should always
be maintained, both conceptually and experimentally, within
its own behavioral scale so that researchers can conjecture
and eventually identify and record the neurophysiological
ingredient involved. Thus, they can eventually understand the
functional meaning of this neurophysiological ingredient of
behavior as immersed in the organism’s integral adaptation
within its environment. The arrow-head of this adaptation,
impossible to eliminate from an adaptive viewpoint and
physiologically irreducible, is, precisely, behavior. 
In effect, only if these issues are understood in this way
is it possible not to distort the meaning of the integral psycho-
physiological functional unity of organic adaptation and, hence,
the very meaning of biological research. And this distortion
occurs, whether, like Pavlov, we consider neurophysiological
functioning to contain or reduce, in its own terms, behavioral
activity, or whether we believe that a behavioral approach to
behavior can be meaningful (beyond a mere animal behavior-
training technique). Although the behavioral approach is always
technically possible, it could ignore the crucial biological issue
of the behavior-physiology relationship. This course of action
has been more characteristic of the psychological guild, whose
paradigm was habitually established by behaviorisms.
Therefore, the aim of this study is to analyze and clarify,
with logical precision, this equivocal Pavlovian concept of
the behavior-physiology relationship. I will also try to
critically detect the scope and influence of this ambiguity
in the very relations between what are, in fact, two moments,
the physiological and the psychological, within the field of
biological research. 
The Presence of Psychological Issues in the Field of
Encephalic Physiology of Integral and Unrestrained
Organisms
In the first place, Pavlov’s discovery of the conditioned
reflexes must be considered an example of the general process
by which modern experimental physiology, once it ceased
to be spinal physiology and necessarily became encephalic
physiology—or, as Pavlov stated, a physiology that must
focus on the whole and unrestrained organism—, must deal
with psychological issues. This means exploring the issues
revealing the behavioral dimension of an organism’s integral
adaptation as the necessary content, formally internal, to its
field. Such a process began to take place around the second
half of the XIX century, in sensory and motor physiology
laboratories. It would also inevitably appear in the Pavlovian
laboratory at the end of the XIX and the beginning of the
XX centuries, in the field of the physiology of the secretory
digestive glandular reflexes. 
Spinal physiology, by means of its spinal preparations,
had managed to obtain, in an experimentally pure way, the
system of reflexes whose nervous connection centers could
only be spinal or of the brainstem. This is the organism’s
last (or first, depending on one’s point of view) defense
system, comprised of a type of reactions that, in a normal
state, can simultaneously coincide with the animal’s alert,
conscious, or voluntary activity, but in a more or less
automatic way and, to this extent, with some functional
autonomy with regard to conscious activity. Therefore, to
obtain this automatic functional autonomy in an
experimentally pure state, spinal preparations were necessary.
This implied physiologists’ awareness of the fact that, in an
organism’s normal state, these reactions could be integrated
within the encephalic neurophysiological activity involved
in the organism’s conscious or voluntary activity. The way
in which spinal physiology designated and conceptualized
these spinal reflex reactions as un-conscious or in-voluntary
reactions is very significant. Using a privative/negative prefix
with respect to the organism’s conscious or voluntary activity,
the rest of the neurophysiological activity of the integral
organism was acknowledged as always involved in the
organism’s conscious or voluntary activity. Spinal physiology
always acknowledged the fact that the integral organism’s
encephalic neurophysiological functioning (including spinal
functioning, inasmuch as it could be integrated within
encephalic functioning) was, in fact, involved in the
organism’s obviously conscious and voluntary activity.
Despite the above-mentioned need for the physiology
of spinal preparations, this physiology would have a very
limited field of action and it would therefore be necessary
to extend physiology’s sphere to a morpho-physiologically
integral organism. The issue is, when physiology becomes
physiology of a morpho-physiologically “integral” organism,
the organism must be “behaviorally unrestrained,” that is,
in a condition to display its behavioral and/or cognitive
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activity (there is not the slightest opposition between these
aspects, inasmuch as they both occur together). Therefore,
physiological research will now be forced to incorporate
this behavioral activity into its field, to the extent that the
physiological functions to be studied are not functionally
detachable from the activity or behavioral moment in the
organism’s global or integral adaptation to its environment. 
All of this had to happen and did, in fact, happen in
the context of sensory and motor physiology, around the
second half of the XIX century. It was impossible to study
the physiology of each sensory organ without also taking
into account its corresponding perceptual activity because
the physiological functioning of these organs is only
activated when immersed in such perceptual activity.
Therefore, this perceptual activity had to be considered the
very condition of the pursuit of physiological research.
Similarly, it was impossible to study the physiology of
motor activity without also taking behavior into account.
Whereas the physiological functioning of the musculature
was observed to be a morpho-physiological condition of
support and channeling of this behavior, such physiological
functioning would only be activated and operate when
immersed in cognitively oriented behavior. Behavior (that
is, the “voluntary” or “conscious” movements) had to be
taken into account as the very condition of pursuit of
physiological research. 
Encephalic physiology of integral and unrestrained
organisms could no longer disregard the psychological or
behavioral dimension of the organism. Therefore, it must
address the crucial issue of the type of relationships and
differences between both moments, the (neuro)physiological
and the behavioral, within the organism’s global adaptation
to its environment, in other words, the psycho-physiological
issue. Even when the most characteristic ideology of the
guild was prevalent, namely, the ideology that tends to
support a reductive explanation of this behavioral moment
in neurophysiological terms, there was constant controversy
regarding other possible opinions which always tried to
reduce this behavioral dimension neurophysiologically. 
Pavlov’s discovery of the “conditioned reflexes” is no
doubt another case of this general process commented upon
and one that characterizes the emergence of encephalic
physiology around the second half of the XX century. 
Pavlov’s Experimental Discovery of and Approach
to the “Conditioned Reflexes”
In the course of his research of such an apparently
“humble” process as the physiological digestive functions
of experimental organisms, Pavlov verified over and over
that these digestions could not be separated from the very
diverse environmental situations perceived by the organism,
that somehow concurred with the moment of “contact” of
the nutritive substance with the stomach walls responsible
for the digestive secretions. The secretions clearly took place,
not only when the substances acted on contact with the
digestive walls, but also when the organism perceived the
diverse environmental situations that had accompanied this
“contact.”
From then on, Pavlov had to aim his research at
establishing an experimental design capable of exercising
systematic control over the process by which his organisms
performed the “psychological digestions” that he encountered
time and again in his laboratory. As formulated in Pavlov’s
basic canonical terms, the conditioned learning process by
which a perceived environmental situation, that at first only
elicits a cognitive orientation reaction, can, due to its repeated
temporal association with a stimulus that elicits an
“unconditioned” (“universal” or “absolute”) reflex reaction,
as a result of its conditioning or reinforcement by the
unconditioned stimulus, eventually elicit a reflex reaction
that is similar (at least qualitatively) to the unconditioned
reaction. The situation thus becomes a conditioned
discriminative situation (which is still called “stimulus”)
that subsequently acts as an anticipatory signal for the
unconditioned stimuli on which it depends. 
Thus, Pavlov bequeathed to subsequent psychological
research the technique, the method, or the procedure of
experimental achievement and control of conditioned reflex
responses. However, Pavlov was a physiologist, which means
he worked in a field that could not overlook the biological
functional unity of the psychological and physiological
dimensions of the organic adaptation, no matter which solution
was subsequently chosen about the relation between both
moments of this living functional unity. Therefore, Pavlov
could not limit himself to the experimental control and
reconstruction of the psychological process of conditioning
reflex responses, but instead became interested in the
neurophysiological functioning involved in this psychological
process, as well as the crucial issue of the relationship between
both moments of the organism’s living functional unity. This
is the fundamental “classic” importance or scope of Pavlov’s
work, which I feel should not be ignored or disregarded. I
refer to his tenacious refusal, typical of the biological
perspective, to dissociate or break the living functional unity
of the psychological and physiological moments of the organic
adaptation. His ulterior solution to the problem of the
relationships between both moments of the organic adaptation
could—and, I believe, should—be radically and critically
revised, as I will attempt to show below. 
First, note that the proposals made insistently and
systematically by Pavlov throughout his work about the
neurophysiological processes involved in conditioned
behavior always consisted of conjectures or hypotheses co-
related or co-responding to the behavioral situations he had
discovered and controlled.  So, only on the basis of these
effective experimentally controlled behavioral situations
could these neurophysiological conjectures be meaningfully
conjectured or proposed. These neurophysiological
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conjectures were meant to co-respond to the behavioral
situations that had been discovered and addressed.
Moreover, the format of the conceptual content of these
conjectures clearly corresponds, in the form of
neurophysiological vocabulary, to the format of the basic
behavioral situations discovered or addressed by Pavlov.
Therefore, the mutually correlative processes of cortical
“excitation” and “inhibition” correspond with the behavioral
processes correlative to “reinforcement” and “extinction”
(of a conditioned stimulus—CS—by its corresponding
unconditioned stimulus—US). Similarly, the cortical
processes of “irradiation” and “concentration,” either of
excitation or of inhibition, correspond, respectively, with
“generalization” and “discrimination” (of the CS), which
may be reinforced or extinguished (by the presence or
absence of the US). Likewise, the “opening” of a “new
nervous connection tract”–in contrast to the “conduction
tracts” already morpho-physiologically presented by the
unconditioned reflexes–between cortical zones and the spinal
centers again corresponds with the behavioral situation of
temporal association of the CS (discriminative and/or
generalized) and the US, an association in which
reinforcement (and therefore conditioning) takes place.
Pavlov often mentioned the establishment of “temporal
nervous connections” that correspond with the temporal
behavioral associations between the CS and the US obtained
experimentally in the laboratory. With regard to this subject,
readers can consult, among others, the global and late
presentation of Pavlov’s work on conditioned reflexes in
his 1934 article entitled “The Conditioned Reflex”, written
for The Great Medical Encyclopedia. 
On the other hand, it is a well known fact that Pavlov
himself barely had the opportunity to independently identify
and record the neurophysiological processes he conjectured,
but rather it was his school, especially following the works
of Ukhtomsky, that could begin to obtain the pertinent
physiological registers. 
However, I do not mean to suggest, as would someone
with a behaviorist attitude, that such neurophysiological
conjectures could be irrelevant by their mere redundancy.
On the contrary, I suggest that these conjectures should
be made in order to identify and record, in a positive and
independent way, their contents. In doing so, we will not
lose sight of the living functional unity of the organic
adaptation and therefore, be forced to deal with the
inexorable biological issue which is crucial to the psycho-
physiological relationship. In this sense, Pavlov himself
cautioned that restricting oneself to merely obtaining and
controlling conditioned behavior was nothing more than
simple training, if such work were not complemented and
completed with knowledge about the neurophysiological
processes involved in the behavior. In effect, at the Madrid
Lecture, which I will subsequently mention, Pavlov stated:
“Evidently, a great number of surprising facts when
training [italics added] animals belong to the same
category [italics added] as some of our experiments”
(Pavlov, 1903/1982, p. 117, from the Spanish edition of
1982).
In effect, there is an aspect of this physiological part
of biological work which must be emphasized, as Pavlov
himself always did. It is necessary to take into account that
the neurophysiological circuit (cortical-sub-encephalic)
involved in behavioral activity should, no doubt, be closed
in neurophysiological terms, because otherwise, behavioral
activity would be deprived of its indispensable conditions
of morpho(neuro)physiological support and channeling.
In this case, we would be entering the sphere of
parapsychology or telepathy. Hence, as a matter of
principles, independent of the initial conjectural nature of
Pavlov’s neurophysiological proposals and the specific
degree to which his school or general neurophysiology may
have been able to identify and record the neurophysiological
processes involved in behavior, the tenacious Pavlovian
refusal to dismiss those processes clearly means that the
neurophysiological circuit involved in the behavior must
necessarily and unavoidably be closed, in terms of
neurophysiology, so as not to lose sight of the living
functional unity of the organic adaptation. 
Now then, the point is that it is one thing to need to
consider the neurophysiologically closed nature of the
neurophysiological circuit involved in behavior, and
another thing to incur in the equivocal concept, as did
Pavlov, of con-founding, or considering this need to be
the same as the presumed reductionist capacity of this
closed neurophysiological circuit to explain behavior. It is
as if the organism’s integral adaptation to its environment
could be confined and limited to this neurophysiological
circuit, abstraction made of behavior, when it could be that
the neurophysiological circuit of such support and
channeling would only be functionally activated and closed
(for each behavioral cycle or pattern) via the very mediation
of behavior, and insofar as behavior is not reduced to its
conditions of morpho(neuro)physiological support and
channeling. A concept operation is, in effect, “equivocal”
when “one thing is considered to be another,” thus judging
in an equivocal or erroneous way. And what I wish to
state here is that Pavlov, and many others before and after
him, erroneously treated the necessary neurophysiological
closed nature of the neurophysiological circuit involved
in behavior as if said circuit reduced behavior. It may
actually be that the circuit is only activated and closed
when immersed in maintained behavioral activity, and
precisely insofar as such activity cannot be reduced to the
circuit. 
By means of this equivocal concept, Pavlov helped to
promote a distorted concept which hindered the relationship
between behavior and physiology. Let us see how Pavlov
incurred in this equivocal concept, and subsequently we
shall discuss or criticize his own discussion of the issue and,
thus, try to clarifty this equivoque. 
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The Pavlovian Discussion of the Neurophysiology-
Behavior Relationship
I will try to limit this presentation of the Pavlovian
discussion of the behavior-physiology relationship to his
classic work “Experimental Psychology and Psychopathology
in Animals”(Pavlov, 1903/1982), the lecture Pavlov presented
one hundred years ago at the International Congress of
Medicine in Madrid. During this lecture, Pavlov presented
his discoveries on conditioned reflexes for the first time. It
is extremely significant that it was at this first presentation
that our physiologist had to deal with the treatment and
discussion of the psycho-physiological issue, as an issue
raised by the same discoveries he was presenting for the
first time. 
Pavlov began his speech with the statement: “You will
hear how a physiologist was forced to go [italics added]
from purely physiological problems to the domain of
phenomena usually termed psychological.” According to
Pavlov, this was because these “manifestations of a
psychological order” which “I encountered during a long
period of research … on the normal activity of the digestive
glands …. contribute considerably and permanently to the
good progress of the studies considered” (Ibid., p. 109, from
the Spanish edition). As we can see, Pavlov began his speech
from the perspective of a biologist who realized that, from
within the physiological field, the organism’s psychological
activity must be considered a functionally internal moment
of its global adaptation to its environment, inasmuch as this
psychological activity contributes considerably and
permanently to the sound progress of events. However, one
notes a certain cautious tone as Pavlov spoke of his own
definite conclusions. Instead of mentioning just
“psychological phenomena,” he spoke about phenomena
“normally considered” psychological. This precaution no
doubt has to do with his final conclusion, that is, to reach
a reductive methodological-objective explanation, inasmuch
as physiological, of these psychological phenomena in
neurophysiological terms. Pavlov forewarns us about this
at the beginning when he notes that “despite its suddenness,
this transition happened in a totally natural way and, more
importantly, without changes in the methodological
principles” (Ibid., p. 109, from the Spanish edition).
However, despite the reductionist aim insinuated at the
beginning of his speech, Pavlov would be forced to address
the problem of the relationship between the physiological
and the psychological, of the organism’s integral adaptive
functioning. And he would have to deal with this issue in
terms that I consider indispensable, even though in the end,
he would finish by trivializing the complexity of the issue. 
Pavlov began addressing the problem in terms of the
differences and the relationships between the “distance”
discriminative-conditioned situations (the so-called
conditioned “stimuli”) and the organism, and the obligatory
“action by contact” on the organism by the unconditioned
physiological stimuli. In effect, Pavlov began by
acknowledging that the basic difference that must be
perceived between a “purely” physiological reflex
(unconditioned) and a “psychological reflex” (conditioned)
lies in the fact that “in the physiological form of the
experiment, the substance is placed in direct contact with
the organism, whereas in psychological experiments, it acts
at a distance” [italics added] (Ibid., p. 113, from the Spanish
edition). Thanks to this “direct contact,” in the case of the
unconditioned reflex, the physiological response to the
eliciting stimulus can be understood. “In the physiological
case, –according to Pavlov–the activity of the salivary glands
is linked to the properties of the substance upon which the
saliva will act. Saliva moistens and lubricates the matter
that must be swallowed and neutralizes the effects of
chemically active substances, and this is precisely the
function of the special stimulators of the specific mouth
surfaces” (Ibid., p. 113, from the Spanish edition). However,
in the “psychological experiments,” the organism also reacts
by salivating, but now in environmental situations that
Pavlov himself had to acknowledge were “at a distance”
from the organism. Therefore, in this case, the response
(salivation) is elicited by the properties of these distant
objects or situations, properties that Pavlov had to
acknowledge in perceptual terms: 
In the psychological experiments the animal is stimulated
by properties of the external object that are not essential for
the action of the salivary glands, or even by properties that are
totally accidental or lacking in importance: the visual, auditory,
or even purely olfactory properties of our objects .... For
example, the plate on which food is presented, the furniture
on which the plate is placed, the room, the person who usually
presents the food, and the noises made by the person, even if
he cannot be seen at that time …. Presenting our hand, which
smells of powdered meat, to the animal will be enough to elicit
salivation. Also, the sight of the food at a large distance … is
capable of provoking the action of the salivary glands …. Thus,
in the psychological experiments, the connection of the objects
that stimulate the salivary glands becomes more and more
distant and delicate [italics added] …. The importance of these
remote signs [italics added] (signals) of the objects can easily
be seen in the reaction of the animal’s movements, when it
searches for objects, avoids enemies, etc. (Ibid., p. 114, from
the Spanish edition)
What can be said about this distinction, established by
Pavlov himself, between “action by contact” and “remote
connection” to characterize, respectively, the functional
correlation between stimulus and response in the “purely
physiological” case (unconditioned reflexes) and the functional
correlation between perceived environmental situation and
the reaction in the “psychological case” (conditioned reflex)?
Certainly, as Pavlovian research and writings advanced, we
note a decrease in the frequency with which he refers to
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unconditioned and conditioned reflexes, respectively, in terms
of reflexes elicited by “contact” and reflexes elicited by
“remote” situations. Nevertheless, this type of reference does
not completely disappear, but instead it re-emerges precisely
on the occasions when Pavlov has to re-address, explicitly
and formally, as in the Madrid Lecture, the problem of the
relationship between behavior and physiology. As an example,
we can look at his work “Physiology and Psychology in the
Study of Animals’ Higher Nervous Activity,” a report
presented at the Philosophical Society of Petrograd in 1916,
and published in the Psychiatric Gazette in 1917 (see pp.
287-300, from the Spanish 1982 edition).
My proposal is that such a distinction is absolutely
indispensable, crucial and decisive. This is why Pavlov could
not cease to consider it even though he never really displayed
sufficient critical awareness of how much was implied in
this distinction. Hence, Pavlov naively believed that he could
solve the problem posed by simply observing that the physical
distance between the situation that is the object of perception,
and the organism’s surface, should in turn be filled with a
physical-energetic stimulation set that would act “by contact”
with other receptor organic surfaces. It was as though by
this observation the problem addressed would be solved, a
problem that is in fact the very problem of perception. Thus,
for example, in the work we are commenting upon, Pavlov
concluded by saying, “But if we consider it in more detail,
we will see that there is no essential difference between these
experiments—in reference to the psychological experiments–
and the purely physiological ones. The difference is that, in
the psychological experiments, the substances act upon other
body surfaces—the nose, the eyes, the ears—via the
surrounding medium [italics added] (air, ether, etc.) in which
both the organism and the excitatory substances are
immersed” (see Pavlov, 1903/1982, p. 113, from the Spanish
1982 edition).
Now then, by such an observation, all Pavlov has done
is to restrict himself to noting the necessary physical-
energetic stimulation process that must operate, via “contact”
relations, between the remote physical source that is the
object of perception and some perceptive organ so that there
could be perception. Observe that, via this reference to the
physical-energetic process of stimulation by contact, what
Pavlov is looking for is to be sure of the closure, in terms
of relations by contact, of the physiological-environmental
circuit that must be present in perception and, together with
perception, the process of behavioral conditioning. But at
the same time, Pavlov converts the equivocal concept,
consisting of con-founding this physiological-environmental
circuit closed by contact, into the very process of perception
and of behavioral conditioning. Pavlov’s entire argument
strategy is reduced to noting the neurophysiological-
environmental circuit closed by contact, which must be
present in perception and in behavioral conditioning, and
supposing, implicitly and erroneously, that the very process
of behavioral conditioning is reduced to this circuit.
What I therefore propose is that there is no doubt that
this neurophysiological circuit closed by contact comprises
the necessary condition or material ingredient of the
perceptive and behavioral conditioning process, but that the
perception and the behavioral conditioning it implies, cannot
be resolved or reduced to its material condition. That is, it
is necessary to clarify how perception and behavior,
considered formally and in act, cannot be resolved or reduced
to what comprises their necessary conditions or material
ingredients. I refer to the neurophysiological-environmental
circuit involved in this behavior, a circuit whose activation
and operation only make functional sense when immersed
in perceptive and behavioral functioning, inasmuch as the
latter cannot be resolved or reduced to the circuit. 
However, before going into this crucial issue, I would
like to mention two modulations that, at different times
during the evolution of Pavlov’s thinking, his reductionist
equivoque adopted. 
In the first moment, this reductionism adopted a
methodological-objective nature, which meant accepting an
explicit mentalist concept, of a dualist-representational type,
of psychological life. Pavlov accepted a concept of
psychological life as a presumed mental-representational
content, enclosed within the mind of each organism, and to
which other organisms (and man) would have no kind of
direct access. Hence, the possible conjectures about that
supposed mental life made by comparison with one’s own
mental life lacked a minimum inter-subjective validity in
order to guarantee the methodological-objective reliability
that can only be obtained by knowledge of the physiological-
environmental circuit closed by contact. What Pavlov
proposed is a kind of indirect access, methodologically
reliable due to its exclusively physiological content, to a
supposed mental life, understood in the most naïve mentalist
terms, those of a dualist-representational nature. The
following words from the Madrid Lecture, seem to be
sufficiently representative: 
What should the physiologist do with these data—in
reference to “psychological” data? …. Should we penetrate
an animal’s inner state and represent in our own way its
sensations, feelings, and desires to arrive at a comprehension
of these new facts? …. To achieve more knowledge of the
facts, can we compare an animal’s inner state [italics added],
even though it may be as highly developed as the dog, with
our own? …. In our psychological experiments with the salivary
glands, at first we tried to explain in detail our results, giving
free rein to our imaginations about the animal’s possible
subjective state. We achieved nothing but sterile discussions
and some isolated and incompatible personal opinions. We
had no choice [italics added] but to carry on with our
experiments in a purely objective [italics added] field, proposing
the urgent and important task of resisting our natural tendency
to refer our own state to the animal’s reactive mechanism.
(Ibid., p. 112, from the Spanish edition)
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With time, however, perhaps under the influence of the
official Soviet scholastic metaphysics of dialectic
materialism—with which Pavlov lived pragmatically—, he
seems to have accepted the ontological thesis that assumes
some kind of (reductionist) merging of mental life, which is
still conceived of in mentalist terms of a dualist-
representational nature, and “higher nervous activity.” Thus,
neurophysiological explanations would no longer be an
indirect, although methodologically reliable and objective
way of access to mental life, but they would somehow imply
direct access to mental life, inasmuch as it merges with higher
nervous activity. For example, in his prologue to Ivanov-
Smolenski’s book, Fundamental Problems of Pathophysiology
of Higher Nervous Activity, in 1933, we can read: 
We see the rough draft, a natural and inevitable approach,
a merging of [italics added] psychological with [italics added]
physiological, of [italics added] the subjective with [italics
added] the objective. The problem that has accompanied human
thinking will find a ‘concrete’ solution. The sublime mission
of science in the near future will consist of contributing the
maximum to this merging. (see Pavlov, “On the Possibility of
the Fusion of the Subjective and the Objective,” p. 333, from
the Spanish 1982 edition) 
Also see Pavlov’s work of 1934, “The Conditioned
Reflex,” where he states: 
The temporal nervous relation is a universal physiological
phenomenon in the animal world and in human life. It is also
a psychological phenomenon that psychologists call an
association. Why must we distinguish, separate, what the
physiologist calls a temporal relation and the psychologist an
association?  We are in the presence of a complete fusion, of
a total mutual absorption, of an absolute identity [italics added].
(p. 184, from the Spanish 1982 edition)
One notes how the postulated merging is, in any case,
reductionist in a physiological sense, because it is a merging
of the psychological or subjective with the physiological or
objective, and not the opposite. 
The problem is that both versions of the Pavlovian
reductionist equivoque depend on the same type of incapacity
on which the equivoque is based, that is, the incapacity to
discern how behavior is not formally reducible to its
necessary neurophysiological ingredients or material
conditions. Thus, only if we are capable of discerning this
crucial issue will we then be able to clarify both the dualist-
representational concept of psychological life as a supposedly
enclosed or internal mental content, as well as the naïve and
confused idea of the merging of this assumed mental content
with physiological activity. And only then will we perceive
what seems so difficult for all the “objectivists” (who, in
turn, are always implicitly or explicitly “mentalists”): That
psychological life consists of behavior and only of behavior.
This is so because behavior cannot be not resolved or
explained physiologically, that is, by its necessary supporting
and channeling ingredients or material conditions. We shall
now, finally and directly, deal with this issue.
Criticism of the Pavlovian Discussion of the
Neurophysiology-Behavior Relationship
As previously mentioned, Pavlov restricted himself to
observing the physical-energetic stimulation process, which,
operating by contact, should doubtless “fill in” the physical
distance between the remote source of stimulation and some
perceptive organ. However, in this way the issue of what
perception really is has not been addressed or resolved, but
rather only its necessary (material) conditions, and therein
lies Pavlov’s equivoque.
In order to distinguish this difference, and not commit
the same equivoque, I propose that it was necessary for
Pavlov to have had more knowledge in certain areas that
he seems to have ignored. I am referring to the discovery
of the “perceptive constancies.” A discovery that, I believe,
allows one to capture the “secret” of psychological life, that
is, the cognitive or perceptual link of organisms with their
environment. 
What this discovery experimentally reveals—in reference
to the most schematic nucleus—is that the qualities of
subjectively perceived objects (for example, the observed
size or form of an object) correlate highly or predominantly,
although never totally, with the physical properties (subject
to measurement by the experimenter) of the remote or distant
objects that are actually perceived (for example, the physical
size or form measured). They are therefore relatively
independent of the variability of the proximal stimulation
that comes from the remote objects (for example, the
physical size or form of the retinal image). 
This means that distal physical sources should never be
reduced to or coincide with the proximal physical stimulation,
because the notion that perception is perception of proximal
stimulation is functionally meaningless, as its meaning is to
be found in the idea that perception must be perception of
what is remote, only inasmuch as it remains physically remote.
I propose a more general and comprehensive explanation
of the meaning of the perceptive constancies—that is, the fact
that perception is only functionally meaningful when it is of
remote objects, inasmuch as they remain remote. Therefore,
note the crucial difference between the morphologies and
trophic functions of autotrophic and heterotrophic organisms
and the necessary relationship between these differences and
the functional meaning of the cognitive link with the
environment.
Autotrophic organisms, which are capable of carrying
out their trophic functions via photosynthesis of inorganic
substances that operate by physical contact with their body
surfaces, don’t need either the morphology or the function
of local movement, nor do they need digestive systems to
carry out their trophic functions.
On the other hand, heterotrophic organisms must ingest
organic substances (vegetable, animal, or both), that, in
general, are not in contact with their bodies, but instead are
remote from their bodies. Therefore, they must develop two
types of morphologies and functions: not only digestive
systems to ingest and digest such substances, and to excrete
the non-nutritive residuals, but also motor organs for local
movement in the environment, so they can cover the physical
distances that separate them from these living nutritive
substances, and seize them in order to ingest them–all the
more so when these substances are, in turn, mobile, that is,
animal or heterotrophic organisms. 
But then, I suggest that the only way to understand this
“presence” of the remote, inasmuch as it remains remote,
in a non-metaphysical manner (in this context: in a non
dualist-representational manner), is by means of the idea of
“remote co-presence” (of what remains physically remote):
“remote co-presence,” in fact, between the various sectors,
regions, or strata of the physical environment which are
physically distant from each other, and always with regard
to the movements of the organism that, in turn, must adopt
the texture of these “remote co-presences.” 
The idea of “remote co-presence,” proposed herein, to
characterize the “formal texture of the environment” where
behavior occurs, is certainly not unheard of in psychological
literature. A very relevant classical discussion of the adequate
level of analysis of behavior in terms of “remote relations”
between the “distal focuses” between which the “behavioral
achievement” occurs, was developed by Brunswik in many
parts of his work (for example, in Brunswik, 1938, and in
Tolman and Brunswik, 1935), and very particularly in his
later work of 1952, The Conceptual Framework of
Psychology. A critical discussion of this author’s proposal
to adjust the “distal” nature of behavioral achievements
within the positivist (or behaviorist) methodological
physicalist framework can be found in the “Introduction”
to my translation into Spanish and critical edition of
Brunswik’s work (1952) (see Fuentes, 1989).
Note that the idea of “remote co-presence” does not mean
“remote action,” as Pavlov has sometimes naively stated. In
effect, at the Madrid Lecture, Pavlov considered the possibility
of some “remote action” between the CS and the organism.
He later discarded this possibility noting that the energetic
stimulation set, proceeding the distant physical source
subsequently operates “by contact” on the organism. “At first
sight–says Pavlov–whereas in the physiological form, the
substance enters into direct contact with the organism, in the
psychological form, it acts at a distance (italics added)” (p.
113 of the Spanish 1982 edition). However, one should not
even consider the possibility of “remote distance” because
all action should continue operating by “spatial contiguity.”
It is a case of “remote co-presence,” which does not challenge
spatial contiguity, but which is not reduced to this contiguity
in its formal texture. In effect, if we do not wish to enter the
realm of parapsychology or telepathy, “action” should continue
to be used instead of “spatial contiguity.” But, for the purpose
of cognitive functions, “remote co-presence” means the
“evacuation” of such spatial contiguity, that is, of the
“solutions of continuity” via spatial contiguity, which we must
assume go on occurring at all times. Hence, the always “co-
present” “texture” of the perceived objects cannot be resolved
or formally reduced to any of the possible solutions of spatial-
contiguous continuity, in whose scope the necessarily co-
present texture of all perception is just diluted or submerged.
The notion of “remote co-presence” allows one to sidestep
the (metaphysical) muddles that are typical of representational
dualism; that is, both the concept of knowledge as an
presumed inner, or enclosed, mental representation of an also
supposed physical reality juxtaposed with its presumed
representation, as well as the concept of behavior as an
activity, the organism’s body movements, imprisoned within
the supposed physical world juxtaposed with its also supposed
inner mental representation. And this allows one to understand
how behavior and knowledge operate together, immersed in
the co-present environmental texture. 
It is very important to note that perception is inseparable
from movement (from the motor activity of local motion)
as much as movement is inseparable from perception.
Perception, or the co-present texture of the environment
(texture that also includes certain parts of the organism’s
moving body) only has functional meaning if we take into
account those movements that might be cognitively oriented
within this texture. Therefore, we must consider “behavior”
to be only and exactly the organic movements performed
within this co-present texture of the environment (and
therefore cognitively oriented). This texture, in turn, only
makes sense if we take these movements into account. An
effective cognitive “configuration” will only be achieved in
the course of movement, which is now behavioral as its
performance is cognitively oriented. 
We can then understand that the behavioral “functional
arcs” are behavioral just because they occur always within
this co-present texture of the environment. Any behavioral
“functional arc” (pattern, cycle) is made up of some sequence
of transformations of cognitive configurations, effected by the
organism’s own behavioral movements, which are differentially
selected from among possible alternative transformations, as
a function of some hedonic experience (appetitive or aversive)
that so functionally cancels out the functional cycle. Therefore,
both the effectively cognitive nature of every cognitive
configuration of this functional arc as well as the various
alternative links between these configurations are only
behaviorally possible because they occur within an environment
of co-present texture. At the level of spatial contiguity (which
must be considered as operating uninterruptedly), the likelihood
of reaching such cognitive configurations and unfolding their
various mutually alternative links is diluted or submerged.
This is only possible in the co-present texture of environment. 
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Behavioral activity, taken as organic mobility occurring
within the co-present (or cognitive) texture of environment,
cannot be resolved or formally reduced, in its own adaptive
functionality, to its materially essential ingredients. Rather,
such activity acts like an “adaptive arrow-head,” functionally
ineradicable, inasmuch as irreducible to its morpho-physical-
ecological spatial contiguous conditions. By means of this
“adaptive arrow-head” (a) the organism accommodates,
actively and selectively modifying the physical environment
with which its morphophysiology is “compared” by spatial
contiguity. Therefore, (b) it is only within this maintained
behavioral activity that the functioning of the morpho-physio-
ecological spatial contiguous circuit involved in behavior
can make any functional sense.  Intuitively stated, an
organism, hypothetically equipped with the same
neurophysiological activity as that involved in a behavioral
organism, but deprived of its effective behavioral activity,
would be cognitively blind and/or behaviorally incapable
of performing the integrity of the organic adaptive functions
that it can only perform as a result of its behavioral activity.
And so, such hypothetical neurophysiological functioning
would be, eo ipso, functionally inert or superfluous. This is
what we could call the paradox of the “Cartesian Automaton.”
Individuals who believe they can reduce behavior to
neurophysiology incur in this paradox frequently and naively.
This means, therefore, that, despite possible (reductionist)
appearances, the morpho-physio-ecological, contiguous-
spatial conditions of support, and channeling of behavior
are functionally dependent on their behavioral context (and
not vice versa). 
This is only clear when we can let go of the singular
block or conceptual masking that the “experimental
Pavlovian artifact” inflicts on behavioral activity. I propose
that the Pavlovian technique of conditioning is not really
conceptually neutral, but instead is related to some deep
conceptual defect. I refer to the assumption that it is possible
to experimentally obtain these reflex responses making a
formal abstraction of instrumental or operant behavior,
without whose active mediation, it is totally impossible to
acquire such conditioned reflex response. Some link between
a situation and some other reinforcer could be obtained
experimentally, so that the situation would elicit the same
reflex response as did the “unconditioned” stimulus, only
if, in the organism’s past experiences there was some operant
behavior, by whose mediation, the organism actively related
the discriminative situation with the reinforcing situation,
and by whose mediation the “Pavlovian effect” was obtained.
Any organic movement that occurs in a co-present
environment and by whose performance or active mediation
some cognitive configuration is achieved and a reinforcing
situation is obtained, is “operant.” All behavior is “operant,”
so that even perception should be considered operant
behavior, insofar as any operant behavior can only act
through the continued exercise of perception. Thus, the so-
called “Pavlovian effect” should be considered a reaction
that must nevertheless have been acquired or conditioned
in the course of some operant conditioning activity.
Therefore, its functional behavioral meaning is to act like
an anticipatory emotional reaction of the reinforcing goal,
obtained by the operant activity, and this is why it works.
It is a conditioned “activation syndrome,” which, according
to specific thresholds in each case, can either be a facilitator
or an inhibitor of the operant task in question. 
We must adopt the compulsory viewpoint of the Anglo-
American functionalist “law of effect” tradition. For example,
in his classical work “The Reflex Arc Concept in
Psychology,” Dewey (1896) had already established the
basis for a monofactorial and operant learning concept like
the one advocated in this article (see Fuentes & Quiroga,
2001). Only when we adopt such a functionalist viewpoint
can we give up the conceptual error that is typical of the
Pavlovian tradition. According to Pavlov, his “conditioned
responses” are presumably “behavioral units,” supposedly
having functional behavioral meaning “by themselves,” that
is, isolated from the operant course within which they are
acquired and have functional behavioral meaning. No doubt,
the effect of such an abstraction is to give the impression
that operant behavior is susceptible to being formally
“factorized,” or “de-composed” and “re-composed,” in terms
of chains of stimuli and peripheral reactions or in terms of
the necessarily spatial-contiguous nexuses on the scale where
these S-R chains occur. However, the only effective behavior,
that is, operant behavior, inasmuch as behavioral activity
on the scale of its co-present texture, is no longer formally
solvable in terms of these spatial contiguous nexuses that
characterize its necessary peripheral physiological ingredients. 
To consider the so-called conditioned “stimuli,” and even
the reinforcers, as “stimuli,” and to suppose that temporal
contingency associations between them can be understood
from a “metric” concept of time, is just a resource intended
to offer an ostensible verbal appearance of “objectivity” or
of “scientificness.” The so-called (in the Pavlovian and
behaviorist traditions) conditioned “stimulus” is not a stimulus
at all, because the only stimuli that exist are proximal energetic
excitations that influence some receptor tissue by spatial
contiguity, and it is functionally meaningless for these
proximal stimulations to be the object of perception. Perception
can only be perception of remote objects as long as they
remain remote, that is, perception of the distal physical sources
of proximal stimulation, so that these sources, inasmuch as
they are perceived, must possess some co-present texture that
makes their nature of perceived “objects” possible. This
cognitive characteristic would be entirely diluted or submerged
in any of the nexuses of spatial contiguity that fill in the
physical distance between the identified distal sources and
proximal stimulation. In fact, these configurational situations
work and are experimentally treated (both in the Pavlovian
and the behaviorist traditions) like “discriminative” and/or
“generalized” situations (which are those that are differentially
reinforced). These concepts themselves imply the presence
of some perceived configurational situation, and they are
entirely invalidated as soon as we enter the realm of effective
relations of spatial contiguity. Therefore, to refer to
“discriminative stimulus” is totally meaningless. Similarly,
this also occurs with the so-called reinforcing “stimuli,”
because their reinforcing function within each behavioral
cycle lies precisely in their hedonic experience (appetitive or
aversive). This experience can only acquire its experiential
character as long as it already possesses some co-present
texture, no matter how small. That is, in order for the organism
to obtain and maintain this experiential character, shifting, no
matter how small, of the effective proximal stimulations
involved is unavoidably required, and this shifting is performed
by organic movements. Thus, (in terms of perceptive
constancies), such shifting can open up a minimum path of
variability of proximal stimulation so that, with some
independence of this variability, no matter how little, these
experiences can be achieved, maintained, or transformed, as
minimal perceptive constancies. 
It would also be naïve to think that the temporal
contingency associations (or the “accidental and delicate”
temporal connections, according to Pavlov) of the
discriminative situations and the hedonic experiences can
take place within a formally metric time, instead of
occurring, as they do, within a constantly behavioral time,
that is, within a period of time that is formally “patterned”
by “sequences” or “transitions” of operant “transformation”
between various configurational discriminative situations
that eventually lead to some hedonic experiential situation.
When we enter the realm of “metric” time, that is, when
we factorize behavioral time in terms of “consecutive
successions of movement between the parts of a place that
are formally connected by spatial contiguity relations” (on
some spatial-contiguous scale, for example, the one formed
by a mechanical clock), then we are setting up the metric-
temporal ingredients that act as the material condition of
the effective behavioral time. However, this behavioral time,
formally and in act, is not reduced to these ingredients.
Instead, it is only within this behavioral time that the specific
type of “behavioral variability,” which is characteristic of
such “contingent interdependencies” or “accidental and
delicate” connections, can have any meaning. As a result
of such connections, learning takes place; the organism never
ceases to cope with and modify its environment by means
of the “flexible” or “ductile” alternative character of such
interdependencies or connections. Such flexibility, ductility,
or malleability cannot take place within metric time, which
is always of a spatial-contiguous nature. 
Now then, only when we understand the co-present
texture on whose scale behavior moves formally (given that
this activity is not reducible to its spatial contiguous morpho-
physio-ecological ingredients), are we then in a position to
deal with this issue with some conceptual precision, so we
can relinquish the equivocal concept always implied in the
reductionist physiologist assumption. 
Proposal to Invert the Standard Concept of the
Relations between Behavior and Physiology
And so, I maintain that it is necessary to proceed to
“invert” the established or “standard” (physiological
reductionist) concept of the mutual conceptual modeling
relationship between behavior and physiology. This inversion
was the idea behind the “old” classic Gestalt hypothesis on
functional isomorphism between the behavioral field and
central neurophysiological functioning. The most important
part of this hypothesis was that it inverted the concept of
established (representational-dualist) “common sense” that
always tends to consider neurophysiological functioning a
“substrate,” or “base,” and therefore, a conceptual “model”
of psychological life. 
Only when we have realized that behavior cannot be
formally reduced to the necessary relations of spatial
contiguity at the scale of which should exist the
neurophysiological nexuses of the “nervous activity,” can
we begin to realize that the nervous activity involved in
behavior can adopt functional forms of organization that
somehow must be similar to those of the same behavior in
action, notwithstanding the obligatory spatial-contiguous
structural (histological) channeling. This similarity was
pointed out in the “classic” Gestalt notion of a topological
(not topographical) and functional isomorphism of central
neurological activity with regard to behavioral activity. In
regard to this, it is extremely important to remember, for
example, the discussion by Koffka (1935) about this issue
in the second chapter of his classic book Principles of Gestalt
Psychology.
This topological and functional isomorphism can and
should be understood in terms of a plastic and zonal
functioning. Brunswik called the principle of that functioning
a “vicarious micro-mediation” (Brunswik, 1952). “Vicarious
micro-mediation” means the permanently plastic and zonal
neurological functioning where the various “structural parts”
always work “jointly” to some extent, and therefore, always
have some room for mutual inter-substitutability or equi-
functionality with regard to their functional goal. This
functional goal is behavior itself; which, given its co-present
texture, is always occurring so that genuine discrimination,
no matter how small, will always have some degree of
generalization and, subsequently, its various components
can be considered functionally intersubstitutable and
discriminative. 
In sum, the neurological performance implicated in
behavior, notwithstanding its necessary spatial-contiguous
structural channeling, must adopt functional organizational
forms in accordance with the functional organization form of
co-present behavior. Only in this way can we understand (a)
that behavior is this “moment,” physiologically irreducible
inasmuch as adaptively not eliminable, of the integral organic
adaptation, and (b) starting at this moment, and only at this
moment, inasmuch as it is maintained, can the necessary
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conjecture and eventual identification of the neurophysiological
performance involved in behavior make any sense. The
functional organization forms of this performance are
functionally dependent or subordinate and, therefore, “in
accordance with” behavior. 
Thus, we can finally observe not only Pavlov’s tenacious
biological refusal to break up the functional-psycho-
physiological unit of living beings, but also the fact that the
actual conceptual format of his neurological conjectures
(cortical “inhibition” and “excitation;” their “irradiation” and
“concentration;” the opening of “new encephalic-spinal
connection tracts”) was functionally isomorphic with the
conceptual format of the effective behavioral situations he
discovered (“reinforcement” and “extinction:” “generalization”
and “discrimination” that were reinforced or extinguished,
and the formation of “accidental or delicate” “new temporal
connections”). It is very ironic that the man who dedicated
a good part of his efforts to criticize the Gestalt school from
his reductionist physiologist viewpoint should, by his choice
of format in physiological concepts, confirm the daring and
subtle Gestalt concept of the relations between physiology
and behavior. 
Lastly, Pavlov’s equivoque and the reductionist
physiological pretense that it facilitates, are closely linked
to Pavlov’s aim of understanding the content of the “higher
nervous activity” involved in behavior in “reflexological”
terms. In other words, in terms that are conceptually based
on the spinal nervous arcs that are characteristic of
“unconditioned” reactions, despite the attainment novelty
and structural and functional complexity that these higher
“cortical reflexes” are known to possess. The “reflexological”
assumption was assumed at first independently, and almost
simultaneously by Pavlov and Bechterev, in both cases as a
result of the influence of their common master, Sechenov.
But in the following text, we can observe the extent to which
the idea that cortical nervous activity is “reflex,” was a façade,
because of the incapacity to understand how behavior, always
operant, is not reducible to its neurological conditions. In
this sense, subsequent attempts by psychology officially
connected to the Soviet scholasticism of dialectic materialism
to discard the idea of the physiologically reflex nature of
cortical activity—for example, in the case of Kornilov, when
proposing “reactology” instead of “reflexology”—still retain
the worst feature of the reflexological assumption: The
concept of organic activity that, instead of being permanently
directed by the arrow-head of operant behavior and not
reducible to its neurological ingredients, is a mere “reactive”
physiological system considered, at best, to be “merged”
with a presumed mental activity conceived in a
representational-dualist way. Official Soviet psychology never
managed to free itself from the reflexological prejudice,
insofar as this prejudice converged with the mentalist and
representational-dualist concept, proposed by Lenin in
Materialism and Empiric Criticism. This concept considered
knowledge to be a “reflex” or “representation” of an outer
reality. Representational-dualist mentalism was thus the
effective nexus between the official Soviet ideology and the
Russian “reflexological” physiologists’ tradition: hence, the
stage for the confused idea of “fusion” between subjective
activity, presumably mental, and objective brain activity,
presumably “reflexological,” was set. 
However, only by means of an appropriate concept of
behavior as operant organic activity with co-present texture,
can we appreciate that the only level of organic animal
activity that can be understood in terms of “reflex nervous
arcs,” is the level made up of spinal reflexes. And this is
so only to the extent that these reflexes can be considered
in their relative functional autonomy with regard to their
possible integration in the encephalic nervous activity
involved in behavior. Moreover, not even the concepts of
“reflex” or “reflex arc,” because of their Cartesian origin
and the “optical-mechanical” model that this implies, are
appropriate to conceptualize these effector reactions whose
nervous centers can be considered exclusively spinal. This
optical-mechanical model, insofar as it is adopted from a
ray of light shining on a mirror and the corresponding light
“reflected” from the mirror, contradicts the actual functional
complexity of the simplest spinal reaction. Whereas this
model does not expect the reflected ray to be able to
influence and modify its emitting source, the simplest organic
reaction is always functionally a “circular reaction”
(“feedback,” as it was subsequently called), in which the
stimulation must be actively affected and modified by the
reaction so that the reaction will be functionally fulfilled,
and in which there is always room for “selective
accommodation” of the response with regard to the stimulus.
This is so even within the exclusively spatial contiguous
relations that are not yet behavioral. The optical-mechanical
“reflex” model does not reflect any of this, rather it betrays
it. In fact, if the tradition of spinal physiology has maintained
the concept of “reflex,” despite its insufficiency, it has only
been to refer to the somewhat “automatic” nature and the
relative “functional autonomy” (with regard to the “higher”
nervous activity involved in behavior) of spinal reactions.
This functional autonomy should be conceived according
to the criterion proposed herein, while acknowledging that
the functional complexity of these reactions and their
characteristic nervous spinal arc is not reflected upon in the
optical-mechanical concept of reflex. In this sense, it is
interesting to note that even Pavlov, perhaps unknowingly,
followed the same conceptual privative-negative strategy
seen in classic spinal physiology when conceptualizing spinal
reflexes as “in-voluntary” or “un-conscious” activity, because
he conceived spinal reflexes as “un-conditioned” reflexes,
that is, reflexes that are not yet psychologically conditioned
but that are susceptible to being conditioned. 
Notwithstanding this conceptual “optical-mechanical”
deficiency left over from the physiological tradition, Pavlov’s
intention of conceptualizing the “higher” nervous activity
on the model of nervous spinal “reflex” activity, constitutes
a new and different error added to the first one. In the
Pavlovian conditioned response, the sole “reflex” is that its
effector topography (glandular, visceral, or motor) is similar
to the topography of “reflex” spinal reactions. So, although
its effector topography is still similar to that of “reflex”
spinal reactions, the neurophysiological functioning involved,
like the operant behavior where it occurs, will be
isomorphically in accordane with that behavior. That is, it
should operate according to some pattern of cortical-
encephalic “vicarious micro-mediation” in accordance with
the behavioral “vicarious macro-mediation” in which it is
involved, a pattern that cannot be conceptually modeled by
“reflex” spinal arc functioning. 
The “reflexological” concept of the “higher nervous
activity” involved in behavior is then a mere facade to
accomplish or complete the conceptual error that considers
that the conditioning of “Pavlovian” reactions is possible
independently of the mediation of operant behavior. If this
error creates the appearance that effective operant behavior
is susceptible to being factorized or resolved in terms of
peripheral physiological S-R chains whose topography is
similar to that of reflex spinal reactions, this appearance is
reinforced and completed if one assumes that these chains
can be effectively integrated by higher nervous activity of
a supposedly reflex nature. 
And so, the mirage of the Pavlovian “reflexological
objectivism,” according to which behavior is reduced to and
contained in terms of “higher nervous activity,” is definitely
achieved. This mirage allowed Pavlov to believe that the
neurophysiology of the supposed “cortical reflexes” would
offer a scientific-or objective inasmuch as reflexological-
explanation of psychological life that Pavlov, in turn, always
understood from a mentalist viewpoint of a representational-
dualist nature. 
However, in this work, I have made an effort to show
that only when one has an appropriate concept of behavior
as an operant organic activity within a co-present texture-
and therefore, neurophysiologically irreducible and adaptively
inevitable, does the very action of its contiguous-spatial
neurophysiological ingredients make subordinate functional
sense. Only then can one: (a) discard any mentalist concept
of psychological life of a dualist-representational nature and
substitute it with an effectively behavioral concept, and
therefore (b) dismantle the mirage that implies that
psychological life can be reductively explained by a
presumably reflexological physiology whose conceptual
format depends on the equivocal concept that assumes that
behavior—that is, the only effective psychological life—,
is contained and limited within this supposedly reflexological
physiology. 
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